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Abstract. Deterministic DTNs are networks where the behavior is known
in advance or where a repetitive action occurs over time like in pub-
lic transportation networks. This work proposes the application of an
onion routing approach to deterministic DTNs to achieve anonymous
communications. We show how the prior stage of path selection in onion
routing can be achieved using the information provided by deterministic
networks.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider how to provide anonymity in Delay Tolerant Networks
(DTN). DTNs [6] provide end-to-end communication in environments lacking
continuous connectivity or presenting long delays. We focus our work in a class
of DTNs called deterministic DTNs, which are such networks where the behavior
is known in advance or where a repetitive action occurs over time. We will
show that in such scenarios anonymous communications can be established using
an onion routing [8] approach which takes into account the particularities of
deterministic DTNs.
Deterministic DTNs [2, 9] fit perfectly with the concept of oracle schemes.
Oracle schemes are a subset of DTN routing protocols. In this schemes there is
a set of nodes that have nearly full knowledge of the network and its planned
evolution [6]. There are oracles that can answer any question regarding contacts
between nodes at any point in time, this oracles are called contacts oracle [11].
Contacts oracle schemes are used in deterministic scenarios where the oracle
node can have full details of occurred contacts as well as the future ones.
We consider public transportation networks as deterministic because every
node performs the same route periodically so this route can be known in advance.
This information can be shared among all nodes in the network in order to let
them be an oracle, i.e: let them have full knowledge of the whole network. It is
important to note that, despite these networks are nearly deterministic, an error
needs to be assumed for exceptional situations.
Providing anonymous communications in DTNs is not easy and has not been
deeply considered. It is said that onion routing is not applicable to DTNs be-
cause it needs to know the route in advance to construct the onion structure
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of cryptographic layers for each node [1]. Nevertheless, this protocol can be ap-
plicable in deterministic DTNs, where source routing can be possible. Previous
research work on the use of onion routing in DTNs is very scarce. One of the
most relevant is [16], which uses attribute based encryption to per perform the
layering process between groups of nodes. Our approach is simpler since we ap-
ply the onion routing directly as in conventional networks and does not require
the formation of groups.
In Section 2 we introduce our proposal, simulations and provided in Section 3,
and Section 4 discusses the proposal. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Onion routing for deterministic DTN
We describe our approach to provide anonymous communication in deterministic
DTNs by using an onion routing approach. We first need to obtain a model of the
network, and then provide means for the sender to establish the onion routing
circuit (the path to the destination).
2.1 Deterministic DTN model from a public transportation network
We model the network as a dynamic graph G = (V,E). The set of vertices V is
the set of DTN nodes, and the edges E are the contacts between nodes. Dynamic
graphs provide a good way to store dynamic information about the network. In
our case we associate two attributes to each edge, the instant of time when the
connection opportunity occurs and how long this contact has been.
As an example of deterministic DTN we use a urban public transportation
network. More precisely for illustration purposes we will focus in a small pub-
lic bus network from a university campus. The public transportation network
that operates inside the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) campus is
composed by 5 buses that make different routes around the campus. It is im-
portant to note that every single bus makes the same route daily. This scenario
can be seen as a good example of deterministic networks, where each bus can be
equipped with a DTN node with wireless connectivity.
To obtain the mobility model, first, we export the campus road map from
OpenStreetMap into SUMO (Simulation of Urban MObility) [4], filtering some
unnecessary items like buildings and railways with the JOSM (Java Open-
StreetMap) editor tool [12].
Once the campus roads were imported in SUMO, we recreate the buses move-
ments taking into consideration the official bus schedule of the UAB public
transportation network. In addition, we can tune some bus characteristics like
acceleration and deceleration parameters in order to get coherent travel times.
Finally, we convert the bus model to a NS-2 mobility trace [14], which can
be used in NS-3. We used the NS-3 simulator to obtain the contact related data
of the campus network, i.e: information about the duration of the contacts as
well as the instant of time when they occurred. This contact information is used
to build the dynamic graph that serves as the base model of the deterministic
DTN.
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2.2 Path selection
We have a source node s willing to send a message to a destination d at time
t using onion routing. In onion routing we need to choose the number of nodes
n where the message will pass through. Node s obtains a path to perform the
layering process and send the message. The time required to exchange the mes-
sage between nodes is defined as tt. To make even harder the path guessing from
third parties, as the network knowledge is shared among all nodes, the node s
obtains a set of k paths in order to choose one of them randomly.
To sum up, we define a method get paths(s, d, t, n, k, tt) that will retrieve a
set of up to k paths given the t, n, and tt parameters.
The procedures shown in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are an example of de-
terministic selection of paths. Both of them inherit values to filter out unneeded
paths. Specifically, in Algorithm 1, from a given node at time currentTime we
return a set of neighbors that are available or will be available to forward the
message. In Algorithm 2 we perform a recursive search to get up to k paths of
length n from source to destination.
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Fig. 1: In (a) the accumulative graph (t = [0, +∞)) can be seen. In (b) − (f)
different snapshots in given instants of time showing the evolution of the dynamic
graph are depicted.
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Figure 1 shows an example of contact data representation using a dynamic
graph. Applying our path selection method with the following parameters: source
node s=1, destination node d=5, starting time t=0, number of paths k=4, num-
ber of nodes of each path n=5 and transmission time tt=1, we get the following
paths:
— Path: 0 — (1:0) → (2:0) → (4:1) → (1:2) → (5:3). Arrival time: 4
— Path: 1 — (1:0) → (2:0) → (4:1) → (3:2) → (5:4). Arrival time: 5
— Path: 2 — (1:0) → (4:0) → (1:1) → (4:2) → (5:3). Arrival time: 4
— Path: 3 — (1:0) → (4:0) → (2:1) → (4:2) → (5:3). Arrival time: 4
(node: t): Means forward the message to node at time t.
So, we get 4 different paths composed by 5 nodes each, i.e: origin and desti-
nation plus 3 onion routers, so 4 layers will be performed. From the given set of
paths, the source node s will need to choose one in order to perform the onion
routing itself. To make guessing the source node more difficult, the path to send
the message will be chosen randomly from the given set.
Algorithm 1 Procedure to get valid neighbors of a given node
INHERIT: (1) source, source node. (2) destination, destination node. (3) t, when the
message will be sent. (4) k, maximum number of paths. (5) n, number of nodes for
each path (including source and destination). (6) tt, transmission time required to
forward the message.
INPUT: (1) host, host node. (2) currentTime, current time.
OUTPUT: (1) validNeighbors, a set of valid neighbors to whom forward the message.
1: procedure GetAvailableNeighbors (host, currentTime)
2: for each nbr ∈ host.neighbors() do
3: if (nbr.activationT ime + nbr.contactDuration− tt) ≥ currentTime then
4: validNeighbors.add(nbr)
5: return validNeighbors
3 Simulations
As explained in Section 2.1, we use NS-3 [13] to model and simulate the public
transportation deterministic DTN. The DTN modules are under current devel-
opment in NS-3 [19], so we decided to implement a neighbour discovery in the
application layer. This application broadcasts beacon messages periodically look-
ing for new contact opportunities. The interval time is the time to wait between
beacons while the expiration time is the time a neighbour is considered valid,
these parameters can be set up manually. With this simulation environment
we are able to test our proposed method (cf. Section 2) on the small campus
transportation network.
As an example, in Figure 2, after fixing s=1; d=5; t=0 and k=10, we consider
the time required to route a message with the n value from n=5 to n=40. We
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Algorithm 2 Procedure to get paths that follows the inherited requirements
INHERIT: (1) source, source node. (2) destination, destination node. (3) t, when the
message will be sent. (4) k, maximum number of paths. (5) n, number of nodes for
each path (including source and destination). (6) tt, transmission time required to
forward the message.
INPUT: (1) currentPath, current path. (2) currentTime, current time.
OUTPUT: (1) paths, a set of paths that follows the inherited requirements.
1: procedure GetPaths(currentPath, currentTime)
2: if currentPath.size() 6= n and paths.size() < k then
3: node← currentPath.last()
4: validNeighbors← GetAvailableNeighbors(node, currentTime)
5: for each nbr ∈ validNeighbors do
6: oldPath← currentPath
7: nbr.sendingTime← max(nbr.activationTime, currentTime) + tt
8: currentPath← nbr
9: if nbr = destination and currentPath.size() = n and currentPath 6∈ paths
then
10: validNeighbors.add(nbr)
11: else
12: GetPaths(currentPath,nbr.sendingTime) . Recursive part
13: currentPath← oldPath
14: return paths
computed the average delivery time of the k=10 given paths. The minimum
number of nodes allowed in onion routing is 5, i.e: at least 3 routers plus source
and destination nodes. Unlike it is the common case in traditional networks, in
DTNs not always the shortest paths are the quickest ones, but even so we can
see in the figure an increasing tendency.
4 Discussion
Unlike traditional onion routing, our approach could suffer from the predictabil-
ity of the routing path. This is why the proposed method in Section 2.2 returns
a set of k paths, and the final path is selected at random from the set. This
lowers the probability for an attacker to guess the source of a communication by
predicting the path. The exact probability will depend in the concrete scenario
and setup. Besides this point, our approach presents the same security problems
and benefits of traditional onion routing.
We can then consider threats imposed by passive adversaries (observe traffic
patterns) and active adversaries (perform actions against other nodes or modify
information in transit).
We assume that there is a prior secure key distribution procedure. The re-
quired network information as well as the cryptographic keys are distributed
to the nodes at a previous stage, i.e: before starting the periodical routing. The
public keys of the nodes are known to each other and used to establish each onion
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Fig. 2: Average delivery time considering the variation of the path length.
layer. Unlike current popular implementations of onion routing such as Tor [3]
we cannot use Diffie-Hellman or similar interactive approaches to derive session
keys in a DTN scenario. Symmetric session keys can be directly established or
generated from a seed provided by each node to the successor node as in [8, 15].
At the moment we use directly public key encryption since most applications
over DTN only need to send small quantities of data in one direction.
4.1 Passive adversaries
As explained in [10], if the attacker is the destination of the message, he can
obtain information from the delay between messages. This kind of attack does
not work when the sending start time, known as t in our path selection method,
is not highly deterministic [18].
Another attacker model is a set of compromised nodes that work together
to retrieve information breaking the users privacy. One possible situation is the
multiple decryption. An attacker will be able to decrypt more layers, or messages
if one of the nodes is the destination, because they have their corresponding keys.
To overcome such attacks the n value can be increased, i.e: the number of nodes
that will have to pass through the message. A message will have as much layers
as nodes are in the path. There is a trade-off between efficiency and security
when deciding the value of n that needs to be studied in future research.
Another possible scenario where a set of compromised nodes work together
is the source node periodicity analysis. There are scenarios where a node or a
set of them rarely transmit information to others, discarding this nodes from
the probable source set, a globally passive adversary can improve guessing the
source of a message. To solve this issue the creation of dummy packets when
ingress throughput drops below a certain threshold may help to prevent such
attacks [16].
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To decrease the probability of guessing the path when several nodes are
compromised and one of them is the destination, different paths are retrieved
using our path selection method and one of them is chosen randomly. By this way,
we pretend to make harder to guess the sender of the message simply analysing
the origin and the destination of every compromised node in the path as well as
the sending time.
4.2 Active adversaries
As is the previous case, an attacker controlling a single node will be unable to ex-
tract the source of a message due to the use of multiple layers of encryption [16].
There are several possible attacks against onion routing by malicious nodes in
the network like congestion attacks [5], location based attacks [7], and attacks
based on latency analysis [10].
An attacker who has control of a node of the network can attack other nodes
to shut them down leading to undelivered messages. This Denial of Service at-
tacks can be addressed improving the robustness of the nodes.
Message modifications by attackers are easily detected using cryptographic
hash methods. Other attacks like masquerading (nodes pretending to be different
nodes) are solved as layers of encryption check the node identity.
5 Conclusions
We have presented an onion routing based approach for deterministic DTNs.
We also provide the means to easily model the concrete case of DTN networks
deployed on urban public transportation systems. This enables to some extent
establishing anonymous communications in these class of networks using a well
known approach.
The presented idea is an initial step and will require further development.
We will search and analyze efficient path selection mechanisms, as currently our
method is non efficient because it explores every possible path. The efficiency
comes crucial when resource-constrained computers are involved like tiny com-
puters used in IoT, that could fit perfectly in each bus in our scenario, involving
a very low deployment cost. Another future research branch can be to decrease
the impact of active attacks like black holes using a reputation system. Path
selection take this value into consideration. This is not an easy approach, since
it can lead to security vulnerabilities by easing the path selection predictability.
The more reputation a node has, the most probable it is for the node to be
chosen nodes in the path.
We also note that contrary to more common mobile adhoc networks, deter-
ministic DTNs are specially suited to support big delays and disruptions. This
is interesting in our approach since it helps in providing a more stochastic path
selection (a note can force a big delay to avoid path prediction through best
path selection).
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